Which is the 'Best' Electoral System and Why?

The world is littered with electoral systems, a full comparison of which would take a book and not a single paper. Broadly speaking there are two main groups of electoral system: Proportional and Non-Proportional. The comparison in this paper is between the proportional system of the Single Transferable Vote (from now on referred to as STV) and the non-proportional system of Single Member Plurality (or SMP). While a lot of discussion can and will be made in theory, this paper also makes use of two useful case-studies, namely the UK and Ireland. I will first seek to explain the two different systems, giving broad understanding to a complex issue. As ‘best’ is a subjective word, this paper will then consider the potential results of electoral systems and from them discuss which outcomes are most desirable. The strengths and weaknesses of the two systems will then be analysed with reference to their potential and practical outcomes and from this information we may discover which, if either, of these electoral systems is ‘best’.

It could be argued that SMP is the simplest electoral system to have ever been conceived. An understanding of how it works can be attained simply from its name. The fact that it is a ‘Single Member’ system demonstrates that voters are choosing only one candidate. SMP is, therefore, described as having a District Magnitude (DM) of 1. The word ‘Plurality’ suggests that the winning candidate does not need a majority of the votes in order to secure a seat but rather a plurality; just one more than their nearest rival. This sets SMP apart from most other non-proportional systems[1] which generally require an actual majority, or 50% of the vote plus 1. Farrell (2001) explains that “the plurality system is said to exaggerate the winning party’s lead, making it easier to win a clear majority of the seats” (p.29) which in turn should, according to the philosophy behind SMP, establish governmental stability. The fact that disproportionate majorities are formed through SMP can be clearly demonstrated in Table 1 which shows the difference between percentage of seats won relative to votes won in UK elections from 1945-1997.

Table 1: Votes vs. Seats in UK Elections from 1945-1997

(Reference: Farrell 2001 pg.27 highlighting added) Note: Statistics highlighted in yellow are significant at a later stage of this paper.

This simplicity of voting, counting and assigning of votes makes SMP incomparably simple to use and makes other systems, such as STV, seem overly complicated. Tideman (1995) explains that the STV concept of voting was first devised, if only in embryonic form, in 1819, by Thomas Hill “for electing a Committee of the Birmingham (England) Society for Literary and Scientific Improvement” (p.29) It gradually took shape, adopting a variety of, even now, flexible rules. Some of the key players in its development were people such as Hare and Andre (Farrell, 2001). It was a century after its first conception that the STV was introduced into Irish politics and was properly implemented for an election a year later in 1920 (Ogg 1920). Tideman (1995) also explains that “STV is the predominant form of proportional representation in countries with a heritage of English influence” (p.27)

Although slightly more complicated than the very simple SMP, STV is a fairly straight-forward system. The electorate are presented with a ballot paper offering them a choice of candidates. The main distinction between STV and SMP is that more than one of the candidates listed on an STV ballot will be elected as a representative. Farrell (2001) describes this ballot structure as ‘ordinal’ whereas the ballot structure for the SMP system is ‘categorical’ where the choice is ‘either or’. The UK uses SMP, as described above, and, therefore, has a DM of 1, meaning that each constituency has only one MP whereas in Ireland the DM ranges from 3-5. The voters use numbers to rank the candidates in order of preference placing a ‘1’ next to their favourite and so on. Farrell (2001) points out that, although in Ireland a voter can vote for as few or as many of the listed candidates as they like, other countries that use the STV system, such as Australia, sometimes require voters to rank every single candidate in preferential order[2]. The STV process, so far, has been pretty straight-forward for the voter. It can prove a little more difficult when one is presented with a list dozens of candidates but in Ireland the list is usually fairly short, especially as their highest DM is only 5.

Then begins counting, a process which, as Farrell (2001) acknowledges, can take days. The first round is simple. The first choice candidate of each voter is identified, giving each candidate a value of total votes accrued. Although it is then possible to list all the candidates in an order of preference the process is not over. Only candidates who have gained a certain quota of votes automatically gain one of the seats on offer. The quota most often used is called the Droop quota. Farrell (2001, p.127) illustrates the formula used in the following way:

To give a simple example, if there were 1000 valid votes for 4 contested seats one would have to divide 1000 by (4+1) or 5 and then to that add 1 more single vote to the sum. That would mean a seat, in this example, is won when a candidate secures 201 votes. If, as is often the case, not all the seats are filled by candidates who have exceeded the quota, the counting must enter a second round. The first step of the second round is to redistribute the surplus votes of any candidates who have already won a seat. These votes will be redistributed to the second choice candidate of all the people who voted for the already victorious candidate. Farrell (2001) explains that, as it would be unfair to pick these surplus votes randomly, a formula has been devised to redistribute votes more fairly. The number of surplus votes is divided by the total number of votes won by the already victorious candidate. This number is then multiplied by the number of second choice votes received for each remaining candidate, giving each an allocation of votes. If all seats are still not filled and redistribution of a second winning count is unlikely to fill all of the available seats then the candidate with the least votes is removed from the contest and their votes are redistributed in a similar fashion as explained above. This process is repeated until all seats are filled.

It is clear from these descriptions that SMP is the most straight-forward and easy-to-use system. What must now be discovered is how significant the ease of use is when compared with the other desired outcomes of electoral systems. A survey of electoral systems experts[3] (Bowler et. al. 2005) was conducted to establish “expert opinion” on a variety of issues, including the most desirable outcomes for an election. The potential outcomes of the different electoral systems tested in the survey were: representation of minorities, accountability of government, proportionality, effective government, good constituency representation and cohesive parties. These properties were then voted upon by the specialist academics to determine which outcomes were most desirable and which were least important. Table 2 shows the results of this survey.

Table 2:

Reference: Bowler et al. (2005) p.11

Although STV fulfils the most highly ranked criteria, namely proportionality of outcome, it could be accused of not fulfilling the fourth most popular category; simple for voters to use. It is democratically important that an electoral system is easy to use since, if it is not, it may be said that only the well educated will be able to fully understand the system and, therefore, express their vote accurately. This could quite easily lead to a disproportionate over-representation of the educated classes in Parliament. In praise of the simplicity of SMP, Farrell (2001) states: “The whole process requires barely a minute to complete” (p.23). May 2007 witnessed much controversy surrounding the use of the STV in Scottish elections. The BBC (2007) and many other news agencies reported the occurrence of spoilt ballots because people did not fully understand the system. It could be said, however, that the confusion did not exist because of the electoral system but rather because people were asked to perform two different elections with two different systems at the same time. In defence of STV, it could be said that, although the system of counting and distributing votes may be fairly complex, the role played by the voters themselves is very straight-forward. In fact, because each vote under STV can be so influential, the effect each voter’s choice has on the overall political situation may be more easily understood than in SMP where tactical voting must often be used to make any political difference. Referring to elections under STV in Ireland, Farrell (2001) quotes Bogdanor as saying, “the system [did not] prove complicated for voters” (p.29). He went on to show that there was not an increase of invalid votes in Ireland when they switched to STV.

It could be said that the two most popular outcomes, as shown on Table 2, are also the two most likely not to co-exist strongly within a single electoral system. It is generally boasted that non-proportional systems, such as SMP produce stable governments, while proportional systems, such as STV, clearly produce a proportionality of outcome and, arguably, a less stable government. Bowler et al. (2005) explain that the reason these two, seemingly, polar opposite outcomes rank highly is that “people who like [proportional representation systems]… do not like SMP [and other non-proportional systems” (p.11) and as academics with a variety of opinions were polled, a division in opinion over outcome emerged. Those academics who favour stable government as an outcome will support systems such as SMP, while people who desire proportionality as an outcome will favour systems such as STV. While, therefore, it is clear from Table 2 that proportionality of outcome is the most desired feature of electoral systems amongst academics, it is unfair to label SMP as worse than STV simply because it is not proportional. The supporters of SMP never claimed to be proportional and, in fact, do not desire, pretend or want it to be such.

The purpose of SMP is to produce “one-party majority governments that would otherwise not exist” (Blais and Carty 1988, p. 550) It is thought, therefore, that when SMP achieves that it produces stable government which is considered more important than any of the other desired outcomes. If, however, it could be demonstrated that SMP neither produces one-party majorities nor, even when it does, will it ensure a stable government, the supposed strengths of the system seem to vanish. Blais and Carty (1988) go so far as to say that, “without this benefit, the seat bonus that [SMP] regularly delivers to large parties could not be easily justified” (p.550) Blais and Carty (1998) explain the following:

“There is no doubt that [SMP] elections are more likely than proportional ones to assure a majority to a party with only a plurality of the vote. The relative probability is nine times as high. But the data indicates that such outcomes are even more common in multi-member majority contests.” (p.552)

It seems clear from this that SMP is not even the best system among non-proportional systems at producing the results its supporters suggest are most important, namely strong, stable governments. Combined with this are some interesting points we can see from looking back at the highlighted sections of Table 1. It is clear that on at least five occasions, between 1945 and 1997, SMP in the UK has only managed to secure a very weak majority in parliament. It could be said that this produces weak or fragile governments, a direct antithesis of the purpose of SMP. So, not only is SMP statistically not the best system for producing stable government, in practical terms it has failed 5 out of 15 times to produce the strong and stable governments it promises.

Another criticism of SMP is that it is less to do with people and more to do with boundaries. Certain regions of the UK are traditionally supporters of one or another of the two major parties. Individuals living within these constituencies have no opportunity to affect their situation whether they vote or not and, therefore, none of being directly represented in parliament. Closer inspection of the boundaries highlights another issue concerning the population sizes of constituencies and, therefore, individual voters relative values in the electoral system. Farrell (2001) states that, in the UK, under SMP, “the benefit of simplicity can be (and often is) at the cost of fairness – fairness to smaller parties and the supporters of smaller parties, fairness to those ‘trapped’ in seats which are safely held by parties they do not support” (p.29). Delury (1999) gives evidence that “in 1997 [UK constituency populations] ranged from 22,983 registered voters to 101,680” (p.1159) While it could be said that this may be to do with the structure of the country rather than the electoral system[4] it is improbable that disparities as large as this could exist under a system of proportional representation.

It is not only SMP which has technical faults. Tideman (1995) makes various criticisms of STV which seem to apply only when it used to elect a single person. Farrell (2001) would argue that if this were the case the system could not be called STV as “STV operates with a district magnitude greater than 1” (p.126) He does, however go on to highlight some academic criticisms of STV. The main one of these is that STV is ‘non-monotonic’. Farrell (2001) explains that this means, occasionally, someone gaining more votes than anyone else in the first round but not achieving enough to push them past the quota may be damaged by their initial popularity when the votes of excluded candidates are then redistributed amongst the remaining candidates. Farrell (2001) defends STV by highlighting that, “a statistical test of the issue has produced the prediction that, were STV to be used in the UK, there would be ‘less than one incidence [of this] every century’” (p.150).

From the evidence given above we can begin to decide which electoral system is best. The accusations made against STV, that it is too complicated and that it sometimes produces irrational results, all seem to have been discredited or at least identified as relatively insignificant. On the other hand, SMP has been accused of being undemocratic, overly complicated (especially when considering boundary issues in the UK) and it has been shown that SMP does not even do what it is meant to do; produce stable governments. If this is not reason enough one could just ask the experts. The Bowler et al. (2005) survey of electoral system experts asked academics to list electoral systems in order of preference. Overall PR systems ranked 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th. Non-PR systems ranked 4th, 6th and 7th. STV came in 2nd and SMP ranked 6th. It is not surprising, given this expert opinion, that when new democracies have emerged in the last century, that they have steered clear of systems such as SMP and rather opted for the more fair and democratic proportional systems, such as STV. Some may be left wondering why the system is not simply changed. The answer seems obvious when we consider the fact that the incumbent party, with whom the power to make changes lies, is unlikely to want to change the system which has secured themselves power.


[1]Although the system is used in Japan, Multi-Member Plurality (MMP) is a very rare form of non-proportional electoral system.
[2] Heitshusen et al. (2005) explain that, when voting for the Australian senate, voters have the choice between regular STV or rather simply voting for their preferred party, referred to as Group Ticket Voting (GTV) which is almost the same as a closed-party list and is far less proportional than STV.
[3] It is interesting to note that throughout the survey the preferred method of vote counting was STV as it seemed to give the most accurate results.
[4] In the USA, for instance, where they also use STV they have much stricter parameters on constituency population sizes which leads to greater proportionality in representation, or gives a more equal spread of representation.

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Liberal Democracy vs Terrorism: Who is winning and why?

For as long as it has existed people have sought to fight terrorism[1] but, since the attacks on the World Trade Centre on the 11th of September 2001, liberal democracies have been given an excuse to expand the scope and boundaries of counter-terrorist measures. Bush’s declaration of a ‘war on terror’ may be the single most pertinent example of counter-terrorism in the 21st century. Using the US and the UK as case-studies, this essaywill seek to explain some of the dilemmas arising from the implementation of more stringent and intrusive policies since the declaration of a ‘war on terror.’ The first thing that must be assessed is the legitimacy of the war itself and how it fits into pre-existing just war theories. The paper will then identify actions taken to fight terrorism domestically before looking at laws passed or broken in the UK and US in the fight against terror and assess the impact of such actions. The final section will look at torture and the suspension of international law in the ‘war on terror.’ This overview of significant issues will portray some of the main difficulties arising from the execution of counter-terrorism in modern, liberal democracies. It will highlight controversies over human rights, civil liberties and the efficacy, or otherwise, of the policies introduced to implement the current ‘war on terror.’

Just nine days after the attacks on the World Trade Centre President Bush declared his ‘war on terror’ (Whitehouse, 2001). While a military response to terrorism may be said to have little effect on the democratic countries from which the attack is launched it will be shown that the ‘war on terror’ continues to have both a domestic and international impact. Many people have questioned whether the war is just. An outward sign that this is a real issue were the public demonstrations against the US-UK bi-lateral declaration of war on Iraq,[2] as part of the general ‘war on terror.’ Using the example of the Allies declaration of war on Nazi Germany as a paradigm, Walzer (2006) explains that war is justified when resisting armed aggression across international borders and ends when the offending military force is defeated[3]. The case of the general war on terror is more complicated than a war between nations. Terrorists are, indeed, armed and aggressive by most accepted definitions and, while not confined to a single state, they increasingly threaten international peace. We may, however, bring into question the efficacy of and, therefore, justification for a military response to stateless terrorism. Comparing international terrorism to the Hydra, a mythological creature with the ability to spawn two heads in the place of one when one is severed, Silke (2005) suggests that a military response “can have a negative impact far greater than many of the issues which are traditionally seen as root causes of terror” (p.241). He goes on to explain that, violence justifies violence and that when we justify violent retaliation we erroneously expect them not to think or act in the same way. The result is a never ending, increasingly violent war, which, therefore, falls short of Walzer’s definition of a just war as one that ends with the military defeat of the aggressor. We have been presented with military retaliation as a viable counter-terrorist initiative and, in spite of some civil opposition, liberal democracies continue to wage this war.

Schmid (2005) makes the point that there are two approaches to countering terrorism. One is to attack the causes of terrorism and the other is to fight “the manifestations of terrorism itself” (p.223). It is interesting to realise that the West's ‘war on terror’ has encompassed both of these by fighting the countries from which international terrorism originates and by imposing restrictions upon their own citizens in an attempt to reduce the perpetuation of terrorist activity domestically. These restrictions range from the implementation of stronger anti-terror laws to granting police increased powers.

In an effort to stop terrorist attacks on UK soil, metropolitan police have been given the right to carry and use guns. Presuming guilt rather than innocence and instructing police officers to shoot-to-kill may be considered a heavy-handed response and over-reaction to the threat of terror. Wilkinson’s (2006, p.61) observation that overreacting “could destroy democracy far more rapidly and effectively than any campaign by a terrorist group” is pertinent when considering the shooting dead of Jean Charles de Menezes (BBC News 2007). Schmid (2005) explains how counter-productive such an episode can be when he states:

“A police that is respected and trusted by the public because it reacts adequately without overreacting tends to obtain voluntarily information on criminal and terrorists in particular from society” (p. 233).

Conversely, a police force that overreacts separates themselves from the trust of the public which, in turn, makes their job of countering terrorism and gathering intelligence more difficult.

Such violence against the public was partly the result of changing and more stringent laws introduced by the government in an attempt to curb terrorism. Bamford (2004) explains that this included the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), which gave authority to detain, without trial, any immigrant or Asylum seeker suspected of being involved with international terrorism. Those powers have grown and authorities can now detain any UK citizen, without trial, evidence, or charge, who may be suspected of involvement with terrorist activity. At the moment the detention limit for such suspects is 28 days but, with the new ‘Terror Bill’ the government is attempting to extend that to 42 days (BBC 2008a).

The UK is not alone in its suspension of human rights and civil liberties as a method of countering terrorism. In contravention to both federal and international law the Bush administration has set up Guantanamo Bay, a prison for holding what he describes as ‘unlawful combatants.’ This military prison is not only for people detained on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan but for any person, from any country, whom the US suspects of being involved in terrorist activity. Wilkinson (2006) describes how “the US government devised a system of military tribunals… [but that] very few [suspected terrorists] have ever had the chance of appearing before a tribunal.” (p.63) The result is that there are hundreds of people being detained without trial for an indefinite period of time.

As discussed above, a ‘war on terror’ is indefinite by nature. The implementation, therefore, of morally-questionable laws, as seen in the UK, or the breaking of laws, as in the US, on a perpetual basis tend to separate the public from the government. Such cleavages can not only hinder counter-terrorism efforts but may also encourage the spread and growth of terrorist activity domestically.

It is not only national laws but international laws which are being broken in the ‘war on terror’. Danner (2004) describes how, since images of US soldiers torturing Iraqis in Abu Ghraib were broadcast, in April 2004, many hundreds of cases of torture have been confirmed. According to the ‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (OHCHR 1984), which the US has signed, such actions are totally illegal under international law. Although he initially denied condoning the use of torture, Bush has declared that any means of gaining intelligence on possible terrorist attacks is justifiable and that “whatever [the US government and military] do will be legal” (BBC News 2008b). Sands (2008) describes how the television series 24, which erroneously portrays torture as a viable and effective form of information gathering, was broadcast across the world and especially in the US shortly after Bush’s declaration of ‘war on terror’. The accusation is that popular-culture is being used to lie to the masses and that this forced ignorance creates public consent to Bush’s desire to break international law.

Schmid (2005) argues that terrorism is a crime like any other but that it aims to change or influence politics. By implementing strict laws and using heavy-handed methods of policing domestically, liberal democracies have helped terrorists to achieve such goals. Suspending their responsibility to protect human rights and civil liberties governments have “use[d] the law as a political instrument against their opponents” (ibid. p.227) at the cost of the credibility of the law itself. It has been empirically shown that low levels of human rights leads to high levels of terrorism (ibid). This helps to explain the increased support for and appearance of domestic terrorism. Similarly oppressive tactics have been utilised internationally. The ‘war on terror’ has subjected many to torture and humiliation (Danner 2004). Recognising that “a key motivation for joining a terrorist organisation ultimately revolves around a desire for revenge” (Silke, 2005) many thousands of people have, because of US and UK foreign policy, been given a reason to fight the oppressive West in a war of terror. Meanwhile, using popular culture and the media, politicians and corporations, whose interests lie in the fighting and winning of wars around the world, have convinced members of so-called liberal democracies that they are justified in their violence. Ignoring the propaganda, what becomes clear from evidence and experience is that a violent response to terrorism is not working and that citizens of liberal democracies must preserve their freedoms by standing up against their oppressive governments and finding new ways to curb terrorism both at home and abroad.


[1]For instance, Schmid (2005) points out that the United Nations has been actively concerned with International Terrorism since 1972.
[2] Chomsky’s (2003) section on International Law and Institutions gives an account of how the US ignored international law when declaring war on Iraq and how their special friend, the UK, showed full support for their illegal plans.
[3] By this definition it is clear that the war with Iraq was unjust as Sadam Hussein was no longer pursuing violence over international borders

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Welcome to the New World Order

James Monroe, the fifth president of the United States of America, served two terms in office from 1817-1825. On the second of December 1823 he delivered his address to the US Congress in which he unveiled what would become known as the Monroe Doctrine. This philosophy was largely ignored for quite some time and only truly enforced by the future president, Roosevelt’s, amendment to it. This article seeks to uncover the historical setting for the Monroe doctrine, the reason for its delay and the steps towards its enactment and its practical application in Latin America and the wider world since the Roosevelt Corollary.

The United States was still a young country by the time James Monroe became president in 1817. Britain maintained the top position in the world economy. It was in this setting, in 1823, that James Monroe, in his sixth year of presidency, gave a speech which “declared that the Americas were no longer open to European colonization and that the United States would regard any intervention of a European power in the Americas as an unfriendly act against the United States.” Although the thought of national superiority had already begun to grow in the minds of the citizens, especially among the elite of the United States, they were not, at the time, in a position to actually enforce this bold statement. We can therefore, in hindsight, see that the Monroe Doctrine was more a vision of things to come than an implementation of US foreign policy.

Over the next few decades, as Latin American countries began to gain their independence and European powers became consumed in regional issues, the situation in the ‘New World’ began to change, especially within the borders of the ever expanding United States.

Despite Monroe’s declaration, European powers continued to intervene in the affairs of Latin America. It was not until 1842, when the British tried to stop Texas joining the United States, that the US government, under the control of President John Tyler, began to object to this interference. The United States continued their expansion across the American continent throughout the 1840s. President James Polk, the eleventh president, serving from 1845-1849, redefined the parameters of the Monroe Doctrine to explain that, while the doctrine declared that no European power could invade or conquer a territory or state in the western hemisphere, “the Monroe Doctrine did not prohibit territorial changes among the nations of [the western] hemisphere.” This strategy further accelerated the desire and self-justification of the expansionist attitudes of the United States which lead to Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and California all falling to the power of the United States in the space of a single decade.

Not only did the United States feel justified in their pursuit of western hemispheric dominance politically, they also felt justified by a sense of Manifest Destiny. This term was coined by John O’Sullivan, the US diplomat to Portugal. It suggests that the white, Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of North America, especially those who were citizens of The United States, were chosen and set apart by God to bring order to the New World and, eventually, the whole world. This quote from John O’Sullivan shows how patently racist this mentality was; “This Continent is for white people, and not only the continent but the islands adjacent, and the Negro must be kept in slavery.” This attitude was apparent throughout all sectors of society from religious and political leaders to the layman in the street. The following two quotes, the first from Reverend Strong, a key religious figure, the second from Senator Albert J. Beveridge demonstrate the national mentality “This powerful race will move down Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the ‘survival of the fittest?’” “God has marked the American People as His chosen Nation to finally lead to the regeneration of the world… we are trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.”

These statements help us to see how the Monroe Doctrine went from being one man’s vision, to a nation’s belief which could act as justification for war and the violent expansion, as apparent in the cases of Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and California, of a racist regime. Before I move on to discuss the Roosevelt Corollary there is another incident which demonstrates that this national superiority complex justified forced annexation as well as expansion.

Cuba was ‘discovered’ by Columbus on his first voyage to the Americas in 1492. It was initially used only to launch missions to North America and Mexico. When it was eventually colonised, most of the indigenous peoples were killed. The Spanish, therefore, had to import slaves from Africa to work the land. Initial production focused on tobacco and coffee but shortly Cuba’s main crop became sugar. It was close to the United States and was becoming increasingly valuable due to its dominance in the sugar market. Initially the US offered to buy Cuba from the Spanish; the offer was rejected. Many revolutionary movements had been quashed by the Spaniards but the fight for independence, which broke out in 1895, caught the attention of the United States. “The U.S. public was excited by sensationalist press accounts of Spanish brutality, and business and religious leaders demanded U.S. recognition of the rebels. The expansionist urge… was fed both by those who stood to gain economically and by those who preached of a U.S. mission to rescue the Cubans from Spanish misrule.”

It was, however, not until the USS Maine mysteriously exploded in Havana harbour in 1898 that the US Congress granted permission to declare war on Spain. True Cuban independence was short-lived since in 1901 they were forced to sign the Platt amendment, “which gave the United States the right to intervene in domestic politics at will.” Cuba then suffered more than 50 years of US dominance at the hands of dictators chosen and installed for the purpose of fulfilling the will of US investors and government.

In 1901, six months after the above mentioned incident, Theodore Roosevelt was elected president of the United States. Three years into his two term presidency he made a declaration that would become known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This is what he said; “The adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of… wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”

This attitude towards the world, then and now, has proven to be fatal to the legitimacy of governments, diplomacy of nations and the distribution of power throughout the western hemisphere and wider-world. Examples from the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, George W. Bush and many others demonstrate this point.

For instance, “under pressure from the international community, London agreed… to permit the United States to build, operate and fortify a canal across the Isthmus [in Panama].” There was, however, one final obstacle confronting the US ambition to join the two great oceans; the region which contained the narrowest stretch of Central America was in Panama which, at the time, was part of Columbia, the government of which would not permit the US to build the canal. With the assistance of two US gunboats the Panamanians were able to declare independence from Colombia on the third of November 1903. The assistance granted to the Panamanians came at a severe price; a treaty signed by the US secretary of State and a French adventurer, claiming to be representative of the interests of Panama, which “granted the United States “in perpetuity” control of a ten-mile strip across the Isthmus with power and jurisdiction as if it were sovereign.” The canal was built and controlled by the United States from then onwards and was only handed back to Panama on the 31st of December 1999. Years after the incident, when he was a Nobel Peace Prize winner, Theodore Roosevelt still believed he had acted justly in Panama.

This same imperative, to remain stalwart when in a position of power still exists today in the United States. We witness a president who continues to refuse to apologise for lying to his people in order to gain popular support for an illegal war. Another thing that remains constant is the expansionist and elitist attitude of the American state. Since Guantanamo Bay opened in 2002, we have been inundated with reports of terrible injustices being committed to its inmates. Perhaps even worse than this are the reports from Abu Ghraib. This was a measure created by the Bush administration to deal with the issue of international terrorism. With or without consent from the international community and individual nations, the United States have claimed the right, under the pretence of self-defence, to arrest and detain anyone suspected by their intelligence agencies of being involved in terrorism. This is general knowledge yet it seems nothing can be done to stop them. More recently it has been reported by various journalists and papers, that this power to arrest across international borders has extended beyond those suspected of plotting, committing or funding terrorist activity. “Kidnapping foreign citizens is permissible under American law because the US Supreme Court has sanctioned it” and “the law applies to anyone, British or otherwise, suspected of a crime by Washington.”

The Monroe Doctrine was the dream of a proudly American president but its effects have been devastating, not only to the inhabitants of the western hemisphere but also to the citizens of free nations throughout the world. When a nation believes that God “has made [them] the master organisers of the world” the people, especially the elite, of that nation will act in such a way that their belief may become, as we can witness, a morbid reality.